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One senses the leadership of the G7 growing nervous over the unregulated power of
the transnationals. Even the OECD is calling for controls. I'm not suggesting that we are
headed back to 1960. Nor that we should. I am saying that the force at the core of our
trajectory-and that of many other countries-is the citizenry. And they have been pre-
sented with an unrealistic picture in which economies have been internationalized
through dozens of complex binding treaties, while democracy, social policy, most of jus-
tice, work conditions, and taxation powers have been left, hobbled, at the national level.
The citizens will either require changes to the international economic arrangements
that will permit, for example, sufficient levels of national taxation and regulation. Or
they will require international agreements in all of those other areas. Or some combina-
tion of the two.
Too late, some will say. No turning back now. Things have changed. Globalization is
inevitable.
Well, for better or for worse, nothing is inevitable.
- John Ralston Saul, Lafontaine-Baldwin Lecture, GLOBE AND MAIL, Mar. 24,2000, at A16.
"Does trade rule?"
- The National Magazine: Running on MMT, (CBC Newsworld television broadcast,
Nov. 19, 1998).
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I. Introduction.
A. PURPOSE AND LIMITS OF THIS PAPER.
When Ethyl Corporation of Virginia commenced chapter 11 proceedings I against
the Government of Canada under the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), 2 Canadians were taken aback. Parliament was in the process of banning3 the
import and interprovincial trade 4 of MMT,5 a gasoline additive. A Canadian
Broadcasting Corporation television report on the affair that aired in November 19986
referred to "a little-known provision of the NAFTA."' 7 When the Government of Canada
settled with Ethyl Corporation, acknowledging that the fuel additive MMT did not
impair the diagnostic systems of vehicles and that there was no scientific evidence of
health or environmental problems, 8 Canadians were aghast. Canadian nationalists had
just finished celebrating the anticipated demise of the Multilateral Agreement on
Investment. 9 They and many others suddenly realized that chapter 11 of NAFTA includ-
ed essentially the same provisions they had just roundly rejected.' 0 Public lamentations
over loss of sovereignty due to international trade agreements were widespread. I I A
backlash against sovereignty-limiting agreements was to be expected. The "Battle of
Seattle"'12 should not have come as any surprise.
1. Ethyl Corporation gave Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration on Sept. 10, 1996.
See Ethyl Corporation v. Government of Canada (MMT), NAFTA Chapter Eleven B, Pleadings
and Award of Tribunal, Tab "A'.
2. The North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 36 I.L.M. 605
(1993).
3. Manganese-based Fuel Additives Act, S.C., ch. 11 (1997).
4. Under Canada's federal system, the central government is responsible for the regulation of
trade and commerce (CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1867) ch. 3, Preamble, § 91(2)), while the
provinces are responsible for property and civil rights in the province (id. § 92(13)).
5. Methylcyclopentadienyl manganese tricarbonyl.
6. The National Magazine: Running on MMT (CBC Newsworld television broadcast, Nov. 19,
1998).
7. "For the first time ever, a little-known provision of NAFTA was used by a company to file suit
against Canada for $250 million U.S." Id.
8. Gord McIntosh, Ottawa does U-turn on gas additive MMT, CANADIAN PRESS, July 20, 1998.
9. See Gord McIntosh, Canada could be left out of MAI: Johnston, CANADIAN PRESS, Apr. 30, 1998;
Protest marks start ofglobalization conference, CANADIAN PRESS, May 25, 1998; Gord McIntosh,
Trade talks collapse for a second time, CANADIAN PRESS, Oct. 20, 1998.
10. "The investor-state provisions of chapter 11 expand on the provisions of the standard United
States bilateral investment treaty as well as the similar provisions in Canadian foreign invest-
ment protection agreements. They are also similar to the investor-state dispute settlement pro-
visions proposed in the OECD's draft multilateral agreement on investment (MAI)." J.
Anthony VanDuzer, Investor-State Dispute Settlement under NAFTA Chapter 11: The Shape of
Things to Come?, CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 263, 267 (1997).
11. The Council of Canadians is the prominent voice. See <http://www.canadians.org/>. The
Chairperson of the Council is Maude Barlow. See MAUDE BARLOW & TONY CLARK, THE MAI
AND THE THREAT TO CANADIAN SOVEREIGNTY (1997).
12. WTO Members Search For Ways To Avoid Seattle Failure, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 2000.
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The purpose of this article is to examine some of the implications for international
trade and investment of the Ethyl-MMT affair. Part I examines the background and
jurisdictional award necessary for an understanding of the affair. In Part II, to follow in
the next issue, I will look at the fears some Canadians have concerning chapter 11 in
general and article 1110 (Expropriation and Compensation) in particular. I will attempt
to assess to what extent those fears are founded given the limited experience with
NAFTA's investor-state mechanism to date. Finally, I will suggest possible avenues for
allaying some of those fears.
In concentrating on the NAFTA-related elements of the Ethyl-MMT affair, many
other aspects can only be mentioned in passing. These include the debates in
Parliament,1 3 the extensive lobbying efforts deployed during that phase,' 4 the complaint
under the Agreement on Internal Trade 15 that ultimately disposed of the matter,16 and
Ethyl Canada's constitutional challenge, 17 which was dropped as part of the settlement.
Ethyl Corporation's Pyrrhic victory against the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
and California's continuing ban of MMT are interesting and relevant side-bars that
unfortunately cannot be developed here. 18 The scientific debate surrounding MMT was
confusing and contradictory. Scientific proof of the negative effects of low levels of air-
borne manganese on human health and MMT's contribution thereto might have been
decisive of the affair. But that evidence is currently inconclusive. 19
13. Bill C-94, 36th Parl., 1st Sess. (1997); Bill C-29, 36th Pan., 1st Sess. (1997).
14. Jenefer Curtis, Big Oil vs. Big Auto, GLOBE AND MAIL REPORT ON BUSINESS, Mar. 1994 at 62.
15. The Agreement binds the central, provincial and territorial governments. It was signed on July
18, 1994 and came into force fully on July 1, 1995. See Internal Trade Secretariat, Agreement on
Internal Trade (visited May 11, 2000) <http://www.intrasec.mb.ca/eng/main.htm>.
16. See Internal Trade Secretariat, Report of the Article 1704 Panel Concerning a Dispute Between
Alberta and Canada Regarding the Manganese-based Fuel Additives Act, June 12, 1998 (visited
May 11, 2000) <http:www.intrasec.mb.ca/eng/0798/mmt.pdf> [hereinafter Report of the Article
1704 Panel].
17. Ethyl Canada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney-General), [1997] O.J. No. 4225 (QL); Ethyl Canada Inc.
v. Canada (Attorney-General), [1998] O.J. No. 315 (QL).
18. In 1978, the EPA denied Ethyl Corporation's waiver application for MMT under the Clean Air
Act. On April 14, 1995, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled
unanimously in favor of Ethyl Corporation (See Ethyl Corp. v. Browner, 51 F.3d 1053, 1065
(D.C. Cir. 1995)). The waiver was accordingly granted by the EPA on July 11, 1995 and as of
December 1995, MMT was being shipped to U.S. oil-company customers. See Ethyl
Corporation, News (visited May 11, 2000) <www.ethyl.com/time/html>.
19. The Standing Senate Committee on Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources split on
the interpretation of the scientific evidence. The majority (eight members) found that:
"despite some lingering concerns about the effects of long-term, low-level exposure to Mn,
there appears to be sufficient data to conclude that the emission of manganese resulting from
the combustion of MMT in gasoline does not pose a public health problem." Canada,
Standing Senate Committee on Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources, Second
Session, Thirty-fifth Parliament, 1996-1997, at 11 (visited May 1, 2000)
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/english/senate/com-e/enrg-e.htm> [hereinafter Senate Energy
Committee hearings]. The minority (four members), for its part, concluded "there appear, at
this point, to be sufficient data to conclude that MMT in gasoline does not pose a public health
problem. Based on the scientific based testimony of Health Canada we accept that MMT use
in Canada poses no danger to Canadians." Id. at 45.
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Perhaps unavoidably, the Ethyl-MMT affair lacks transparency. Although there was
undoubtedly significant and intensive private communication during the run-up to and
throughout the confrontation, little information was made public. Both panels involved
met in private. Only the domestic panel report is published.20 The pleadings and the arbi-
tral tribunal award of the parties pursuant to the NAFTA are, however, available on
request from Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade pursuant
to NAFTA, Annex 1137.4.21 Aside from news reports, the main public record is the pro-
ceedings of the Canadian Senate Committee on Energy, the Environment, and Natural
Resources, 22 which considered Bill C-29. 23
In this article, I contend that NAFTA is working much as intended: recourse by an
investor to chapter 11 in general and article 1110 in particular was successful in defeating
a trade-distorting regulatory measure.24 In this respect, Ethyl-MMT is not significant per
se, but is significant as a prelude of bigger things to come. Canadians are particularly sen-
sitive about the move toward private health-care with its risk of losing the publicly fund-
ed system through regulatory paralysis in the face of chapter 11 actions. 2 5 In a larger
sense, Canadians, already alarmed by loss of sovereignty issues, see discussion on these
issues as crucial to Canada's future.
20. See Report of the Article 1704 Panel, supra note 16.
21. "Under the three sets of Arbitral Rules, the publication of an award may take place only with
the consent of both parties. Under NAFTA, this rule is maintained for awards against Mexico,
but Canada and the United States are permitted to disclose awards against them without the
consent of the investor, and investors may similarly make an award public." See VanDuzer,
supra note 10 at 289. The secrecy of the Chapter 11 process has drawn significant public criti-
cism in the wake of the settlement of the MMT case:' Id. n.97.
22. Senate Energy Committee hearings, supra note 19, at Issues 5-14 and Sixth Report.
23. The literature on chapter 11 is burgeoning, partly in response to the Ethyl-MMT wake-up call.
See David Schneiderman, NAFTA's Takings Rule: American Constitutionalism Comes to Canada,
46 U. TORONTO L.J. 499 (1996); J. Anthony VanDuzer, Investor-State Dispute Settlement under
NAFTA Chapter 11: The Shape of Things to Come?, CAN. Y.B. INT'L L., 263 (1997); Gary N.
Horlick & Alicia L. Marti, NAFTA Chapter lIB - A Private Right of Action to Enforce Market
Access through Investments, 14 J. INT'L ARB. 43 (1997); Lawrence L. Herman, Settlement of
International Trade Disputes - Challenges to Sovereignty -A Canadian Perspective, 24 CAN.-U.S.
L.J. 121 (1998); Donald S. Macdonald, Chapter 11 of NAFTA: What are the Implications for
Sovereignty?, 24 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 281 (1998); Julie A. Soloway, NAFTA's Chapter 11 - The
Challenge of Private Party Participation, 16 J. INT'L ARB. 1 (1999); Howard Mann & Konrad von
Moltke, NAFTA's Chapter 11 and the Environment - Addressing the Impacts of the Investor-State
Process on the Environment, INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., 1999 (visited May 11, 2000)
<http://iisd.ca/pdf/nafta.pdf>; Kevin Banks, NAFTA's Article 1110 - Can Regulation be
Expropriation?, NAFTA: L. & Bus. REv. AM. Autumn 1999.
24. Ronald A. Cass & John R. Haring, Domestic Regulation and International Trade: Where's the
Race? - Lessons from Telecommunications and Export Controls, BOSTON U. SCHOOL OF LAW, Law
& Economics, Working Paper No. 99-4 <http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.tafabstract-
id=211668> [hereinafter Cass & Haring].
25. See Shawna K. Vogel, Legal Opinion on Alberta Bill 11, Health Care Protection Act and the
NAFTA, CRUICKSHANK KARVELLAS, Mar. 23, 2000; Steven Shrybman, A Legal Opinion
Concerning NAFTA Investment and Services Disciplines and Bill 11: Proposals by Alberta to
Privatize the Delivery of Certain Insured Health Care Services, (visited Apr. 21, 2000)
<http://www.cupe.ca/shrybman/shrybman.pdf>; Mark Kennedy, NAFTA poses Medicare threat




A. FACTS AND ALLEGATIONS.
It is important to see the events surrounding the Ethyl-MMT dispute in its context.
Thus, I have prepared the following synoptic summary from news reports, 2 6 submissions
of the parties, 27 and Senate hearings. 28 For further assistance in understanding the
sequence of events, a brief chronology has been included as Appendix I.
26. In reverse chronological order of publication: Carmakers question clean air plans, THE OTTAWA
CITIZEN, Apr. 15, 1999; Heather Scoffield, Another US. firm sues Ottawa under NAFTA - Pope &
Talbot says softwood lumber agreement unfair, GLOBE AND MAIL, Feb. 16, 1999; Michael MacDonald,
Free trade battles expected to rage in 1999, CANADIAN PRESS, Dec. 30, 1998; Controversial gas additive
to be discussed, ST. CATHARINES STANDARD, Dec. 11, 1998; Alex Gillis, Fuel battle leaves motorists in
middle - [Greater Toronto Area] drivers don't have choice of MMT-free gas, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 5,
1998; Nahlah Ayed, U.S. company [S.D. Myers Inc.]files suit under NAFTA, CANADIAN PRESS, Oct. 30,
1998; Nahlah Ayed, NAFTA hinders green policies: environmentalists, CANADIAN PRESS, Aug. 21, 1998;
Dalton Camp, You can thank free trade agreement for MMT travesty, TORONTO STAR, July 29, 1998;
Bette Hileman, Canada capitulates on MMT, settles with Ethyl, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, July
27, 1998; Ban bad science, CALGARY HERALD, July 24, 1998; Sylvia Ostry & Julie Soloway, The MMT
case ended too soon, GLOBE AND MAIL, July 24, 1998; Shawn McCarthy, Gas war: the fall and rise of
MMT, GLOBE AND MAIL, July 24, 1998; Andrew Duffy, Grit [Liberal] MPs blast gov't for lifting ban on
MMT, SASKATOON STAR PHOENIX, July 24, 1998; Ottawa bungles the MMT issue, EDMONTON
JOURNAL, July 23, 1998; Dennis Bueckert, Car makers ask suspension of emissions regulations,
CANADIAN PRESS, July 23, 1998; Tory hopeful sees restoring gas additive as sell-out, CANADIAN PRESS,
July 22, 1998; Taxpayers took a hit.with gas settlement, MONCTON TIMES AND TRANSCIPT, July 22,
1998; Liberals reverse trade ban on gas additive, CANADIAN PRESS, July 20, 1998; Gord McIntosh,
Ottawa does U-turn on gas additive MMT, CANADIAN PRESS, July 20, 1998; Additive fears lack clout,
GLOBE AND MAIL, July 20, 1998; Liberals will reverse ban on gas additive newspaper reports, CANADIAN
PRESS, July 19, 1998; Shawn McCarthy, Feds fear loss on MMT, GLOBE AND MAIL, July 10, 1998;
Shawn McCarthy, Panel rules against MMT ban, GLOBE AND MAIL, June 6, 1998; Bryant Avery, Gas-
additive maker calm in eye of gathering storm, EDMONTON JOURNAL, Apr. 17, 1998; Shawn McCarthy,
Provinces attack MMT ban, GLOBE AND MAIL, Apr. 16, 1998; Is the Multilateral Agreement on
Investment the next FTA/NAFTA for Canadian nationalists?, LEGAL ALERT, Dec. 1997; Rosemary
Spears, Additive giving Ottawa gas pains, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 20, 1997; Michelle Sforza, Ethyl uses
NAFTA to sue Canada, INTERVENOR, July/Aug. 1997; Norm Ovenden, Minister rebounds into Ethyl
lawsuit, EDMONTON JOURNAL, June 17, 1997; Janice Harvey, Ottawa impotent under trade deal,
TELEGRAPH JOURNAL, June 4, 1997; Charles C6t6, Ethyl lance une poursuite de 345 millions contre
Ottawa, LA PRESSE, Apr. 16, 1997; Ethyl Corp. poursuit Ottawa pour 250 millions US," LE DEVOIR, Apr.
15, 1997; Kenneth Pole, Ethyl Corp. launching challenge against C-94, ENVIRONMENT POLICY & LAw,
Oct. 1996; U.S. Company files notice to seek $200 million in claim against Govt of Canada, APPLETON
& ASSOCIATES, Sept. 10, 1996; Julie Edelson Halpert, Big Petroleum Concerns Said To Avoid a Gasoline
Additive; N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1996; Court's decision backs Ethyl's right to market additive OIL & GAS
J., Apr. 24, 1995.
27. See Ethyl Corporation v. Government of Canada (MMT), NAFTA Chapter Eleven B, Pleadings
and Award of Tribunal [hereinafter Pleadings and Award of the Tribunal]; Ethyl Corporation v.
Government of Canada (MMT), NAFTA Chapter Eleven B, Procedural Orders of the Tribunal
("Procedural Orders of the Tribunal"). These documents are available from the Trade Law
Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 125 Sussex Drive, Ottawa,
Ontario (Canada) KIA 0G2.
28. Senate Energy Committee hearings, supra note 19, at Issues 5-14 and Sixth Report.
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Ethyl Corporation manufactured MMT in the United States in cooperation with
Albemarle Corporation, an independent Virginia corporation. 29 Ethyl Canada Inc., Ethyl
Corporation's Ontario-incorporated Canadian subsidiary,30 purchased all of its supply of
MMT from Ethyl Corporation. 31 Ethyl Canada Inc. was and continues to be the sole dis-
tributor of MMT in Canada. 32 The MMT imported into Canada was blended at Ethyl
Canada Inc.'s facility in Corunna, Ontario.33 The resulting product was sold to refiners
across Canada and used in forming unleaded gasoline as an octane enhancer (which
increases the explosive power of gasoline) and an anti-knock additive. 34 The sale of MMT
was a substantial part 35- estimated by Industry Canada at fifty percent 36 and stated by
Ethyl Canada Inc. to be approximately one-third 37- of Ethyl Canada Inc's business.
Currently, the most popular gasoline additives are ethanol, methyl tertiary butyl
ether (MBTE), and MMT.38 An eyedropper full of MMT has the same effect as approxi-
mately 2.5 gallons of ethanol. 39 In the production of gasoline, a refiner can run its
reforming equipment to enhance octane at lower temperatures and pressures, cutting the
octane and the expense, and then bring the octane level back up with an MMT "kicker" at
the end.40 Smaller refiners in particular appreciate these cost savings. 41 In Canada, up to
29. Ethyl Corporation v. Government of Canada, Statement of Claim, Oct. 2, 1997, para. 8 [here-
inafter Statement of Claim].
30. Id. at para. 1.
31. Id. at para. 8.
32. Id. at para. 9.
33. Id. at para. 2.
34. Id. at para. 3.
35. Id. at para. 9.
36. Id. at para. 23.
37. Ethyl Corporation v. Government of Canada, Statement of Defence, Nov. 27, 1997, para. 31, note
19 [hereinafter Statement of Defence].
38. Id. at para. 3.
39. Dr. J.W. Roos, Manager of Fuels, Research and Development for Ethyl Corporation points out
that "one of the issues regarding the use of MTBE and these other blending agents for raising
octane levels is that they take up large volumes. You have to use large volumes of them in the
gasoline, 5 per cent or 10 per cent, whereas MMT is a drop-in-a-gallon type of additive."
Senate Energy Committee hearings, supra note 19, at Issue 8, p. 49.
40. Mr. Robert Routs, President of Shell Canada Products Limited noted that there are a number
of ways other than ethanol to increase octane: "We can run our refineries differently ... [or] ..
. we can increase the severity of our reformers, which is one of the processes in our operations.
... We can also do it through the use of ethers. We can tie into a number of components in
order to improve our octane situation." Id. at Issue 5, p. 60.
41. Mr. Alain Perez, President of Canadian Petroleum Products Institute notes the cost issues for
small refiners:
I had some informal discussions with [the Come By Chance, Newfoundland
refinery] and was told that one of the most perver[se], although unintended,
results of this legislation is that their competition in the United States, the small
refiners, will be using MMT and lowering their costs at the moment when the
Come By Chance refinery will not be able to use it because you cannot export gas
with MMT. They will lose some of their competitiveness against their U.S. com-
petition. This is why they have stated that it would adversely affect them.
Id. at Issue 5, p. 49-50.
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18 mg. of manganese per litre of gasoline is permissible; 42 in the United States, the maxi-
mum amount of manganese per litre of gasoline allowed is 8.26 mg. 43 U.S. refiners sup-
plying eighty-five percent of the U.S. market claim that they do not use MMT at all. 44
There is little scientific consensus surrounding the effect of manganese on human
health45 and the environment. 46 To some experts, manganese is a naturally occurring
substance4 7 that, when used in MMT, helps reduce nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions.48
To others, it is a neurotoxin with potentially serious long-term effects. 49 Some health
experts claim that even low levels of manganese in the blood can have deleterious health
42. Id. at Issue 14, p. 3.
43. Statement of Defence, supra note 37, at para. 31, note 17.
44. Id. at para. 34.
45. Id. at p. 8-11.
46. Id. at p. 12-16.
47. Mr. Daniel Krewski, Acting Director of the Bureau of Chemical Hazards, Health Canada, for
example, stated that "[Ilead is toxic at all concentrations while manganese is an essential ele-
ment required in small amounts by cells in the body. Lead is toxic by ingestion as well as by
inhalation, while manganese is not toxic when ingested even in quite large amounts." See
Senate Energy Committee hearings, supra note 19, at Issue 9, p. 8.
48. According to Mr. Jim Pantelidis, Executive Vice-President of Petro-Canada, reducing levels of
MMT will increase the NOx emissions from vehicles:
While we use MMT for its octane enhancing qualities, it has also provided a bene-
fit in terms of reducing nitrogen oxide emissions which [cause] urban smog. Air
quality data from Environment Canada's monitoring reports consistently indicate
a continuing improvement in Canadian air quality, notwithstanding increases in
vehicle ownership and use. Prohibiting the use of MMT could quickly reverse
these air quality improvements, particularly in regions where urban smog is an
issue. For example, estimates developed by the U.S. EPA suggest that the removal
of MMT would result in an overall 8 per cent increase of nitrogen oxide emis-
sions from vehicles. This would result in a significant downturn in the Canadian
air quality, especially for large urban areas. For refiners to offset this NOx
increase through fuel formulation, we would have to severely limit the sulphur
content in gasoline, at a cost of roughly [CDNI $2 billion. The technical and
financial demands entailed in this effort are well beyond the capability of most if
not all the refining companies in this country. The impact on the refining indus-
try could be substantial.
Id. at Issue 5, p. 32.
49. Dr. Donna Mergler of Universit6 du Quebec A Montreal in particular has studied the adverse
long-term effects of MMT:
In the literature are case studies of children with liver malfunctions who had high
levels of manganese and also encephalopathies; that is, neurological disorders that
were associated to their high levels of manganese. Different subgroups of the
population might be more at risk for increasing levels of manganese because their
homeostatic mechanisms cannot control it as well as a normal person.
Id. at Issue 10, p. 41. See also Donna Mergler & H. Roels, Manganese and human health-part 1:
Session III summary and research needs, 19 NEUROTOXICOLOGY 470-480 (1998); Donna Mergler
& M. Baldwin, Early Manifestations of manganese neurotoxicity in humans: an update, 73 ENVTL.
RESEARCH 92-100 (1997) (last modified Apr. 2, 1998)
<http://www.er.uqam.ca/nobel/ise/biof/mergler.htm>.
60 NAFTA. Law and Business Review of the Americas
effects, particularly in fetuses, children,50 and the elderly.51 Low-level exposure to air-
borne manganese is thought to be linked to nervous-system problems and attention-
deficit disorder among children. 52 It is claimed that excess amounts of airborne man-
ganese are toxic 53 and damage nerve cells, producing symptoms similar to Parkinson's
disease. 54 MMT is not the only source of airborne manganese; it is also associated with
steel production and automobile manufacturing. For example, steel subway tracks are
one percent manganese. 55
Aside from its potential effects on humans, environmental experts allege that eighty
percent of the manganese in MMT stays in the vehicle-coating spark plugs, clogging
hoses, and impairing emissions-control devices such as diagnostic systems, catalytic con-
verters, and oxygen sensors. 56 When the emissions-control devices begin to malfunction,
tailpipe emissions of oxides can exceed standards.57 In order to control air pollution,
vehicle manufacturers in the United States designed catalytic converters and on-board
50. Ms. Barbara McElgunn, Health Liaison to the Learning Disabilities Association of Canada
points to studies effects of manganese exposure to women and children:
If you look at the Health Canada risk analysis, [...] the point is made that the
absorption and the retention of manganese in infant organisms is 10 times that in
adults. Other studies show the same thing. Young organisms do not have the
biological systems to detoxify things such as manganese. Also, their blood brain
barrier is immature and incomplete. There is nothing to stop it from getting into
the brain, especially during the prenatal period of development, which is a rapid
type of brain growth. For pregnant women who are exposed to manganese in air,
this manganese can cross into the foetus and go directly to the foetal brain,
because there is nothing to stop it from going there. They do not have liver and
kidney detoxification mechanisms. We are most concerned about prenatal expo-
sures and very early life exposures for children because of their smaller size and
their poorer abilities to detoxify things that they receive systemically.
Id. at Issue 9, p. 48.
51. Id. at 40.
52. Id. at 44.
53. Id. at 43.
54. Dr. Joseph Zayed of the Universit6 de Montreal points out that "[t]hrough this research,
undertaken in the southwestern part of the Province of Quebec, amongst other things we
established a relationship between exposure to manganese and the development of Parkinson's
disease." Id. at Issue 10, p. 36. But, Dr. Zayed points out that the "pseudo parkinsonism that
sometimes stems from heavy exposure to manganese is due not only to environmental factors
such as manganese but also to hereditary factors just as old age contributes to the development
of a pseudo parkinsonism or even to Parkinson's disease." Id.
55. Id. at Issue 9, p. 7.
56. Id. at Issue 14, p. 16-20.
57. "The EPA was putting forward concerns about catalyst plugging, spark plugs not working and
that, in addition to this NOx reduction, it is clear that you see a hydrocarbon increase with
manganese fuels." Id. at 15 (quoting the testimony before the Committee of F. Vena,
Environment Canada).
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diagnostic equipment. This equipment was not designed for use with unleaded gasoline
containing MMT.58
Prior to the ban, the use of MMT in Canada was not perceived by Health Canada as
posing an adverse health risk.59 In Canada's view, however, there were indirect hazards
and risks associated with MMT that warranted the ban.60 According to the Government
of Canada, Parliament legislated the ban on interprovincial trade and importation as an
effective way of removing MMT from all unleaded gasoline produced in Canada. 6 1 In
fact, Canadian refiners could have stockpiled MMT in advance of the ban, legally contin-
uing to add MMT to unleaded gasoline in some provinces for some time without contra-
vening the ban on the interprovincial trade of MMT.62 Canadian refiners claimed that
moving away from MMT would be expensive. 63 Canadian vehicle manufacturers have
warned that the continued use of MMT would boost the price of an average vehicle by up
to $1,500 to cover increased warranty costs.64 They have also said that they might have to
void parts of their warranties. 65
58. "Representatives from the Car Dealers Association and the major auto manufacturers spoke
about the much higher rate of repairs and warranty work on the [On-Board Diagnostic II] sys-
tems in Canada, and pointed to MMT as the culprit, since it is the only easily identifiable vari-
able' Id. at 19. The counterargument by Ethyl Corporation is "that MMT is a scapegoat in
Canada for an OBD system that is having problems meeting its specifications even in the U.S.
where MMT has not been used until very recently in unleaded gasoline' Id.
59. "[I] n December 1994, Health Canada completed a risk assessment on the health implications
of the manganese combustion products of MMT. The main conclusion of this assessment was
that the manganese emissions from MMT are unlikely to pose a risk to health for any sub-
group of the population." Id. at 8 (quoting the testimony before the Committee of D. Krewski,
Health Canada).
60. Statement of Defence, supra note 37, at para. 70.
61. Id. at para. 69.
62. Mr. Alain Perez, President of the Canadian Petroleum Products Institute (CPPI) notes that
very small amounts of MMT are needed, thus making a stockpile an effective contravention of
the ban, especially since making MMT is not banned and "is not a difficult process." Senate
Energy Committee hearings, supra note 19, at Issue 5, p. 62. "We could manufacture it in two
or three provinces and sell it with gasoline within those provinces. It is not a CPPI policy to do
that ... However, each company would have the option, and it is probable that ... MMT will
be in gasoline for a long time to come.' Id.
63. "The estimated cost to the refiners of not using MMT was $40 million to $60 million a year.
But the potential for intervention in their multibillion-dollar industry was much greater. 'We
saw this as a $6-billion issue,' says [CPPI president Alain] Perez." See Curtis, supra note 14, at
66. According to the evidence adduced by the Senate Committee, replacing MMT by ethanol
would cost approximately $800 million per year, (Senate Energy Committee hearings, supra
note 19, at Issue 5, p. 60); keeping NOx levels stable would cost $2 billion (Id. at 33); capital
expenditures would be $115 million and additional operating expenses would come to approx-
imately $69 million per year (Id. at 35).
64. Mr. Mark Hutchins, President of Ford Motor Company of Canada noted that, because of MMT,
"the cost to the consumer of not being allowed to have the system in place to work to its opti-
mum, [would] cost the consumer ... for a catalyst anywhere between $600 to $1,000, spark plugs
are $40 to $100, and to replace oxygen sensors costs $200. That is $1,500." Id. at Issue 6, p. 24.
65. When responding to Senator Whelan's question about what will happen to the warranty on
new vehicles if MMT remains in Canadian gasoline, Mr. Yves Landry, President of Chrysler
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III. Complaint by Ethyl Corporation under NAFTA Chapter 11.
A. MANGANESE-BASED FUEL ADDITIvEs AcT.
1. Ethyl Corporation's Claim.
Ethyl Corporation ("the investor") alleged breaches of NAFTA articles 1102 (national
treatment), 1106 (performance requirements) and 1110 (expropriation). 66 With respect
to national treatment, Ethyl Corporation alleged MMT was in competition with grain-
based products and methanol for octane enhancement -"in like circumstances:' The
claim noted that the Manganese-based Fuel Additives Act (the "measure") did not make
MMT an illegal substance, but that it simply prohibited importation and interprovincial
trade of MMT; Ethyl Corporation thereby alleged that its investment, Ethyl Canada Inc.,
as the sole importer and distributor of MMT, was being discriminated against ("treat-
ment no less favorable"). 67 Because separate facilities would have to be built in every
province, the operation of the investment was affected by the measure ("expansion, man-
agement, conduct, operation ... of investments"). 68
With respect to performance requirements, the investor alleged that the measure
forced its investment to purchase made-in-Canada MMT and blend it in every Canadian
jurisdiction in order to continue business.69 As previously noted, separate facilities would
be required and they would in practice have to be built with Canadian supplies and
labor.70 These requirements were alleged to be arbitrary and unjustified, a disguised
restriction on international trade and investment, and not necessary to protect human,
animal, or plant life or health, or for the conservation of natural resources.
71
Finally, with respect to expropriation, the investor alleged that the purpose of the
measure was to terminate the investment's ability to continue its business of distributing
MMT throughout Canada. The measure, therefore, had the effect of expropriating the
investor's investment. In addition, the investor's and investment's goodwill around the
world was adversely affected.
2. Canada's Response.
Because of procedural irregularities, Canada first argued that the Tribunal did not
have jurisdiction. 7 2 Ethyl Corporation had given its notice of claim before the
Manganese-based Fuel Additives Act was adopted. According to Canada's submission, tim-
Canada Limited responded that "[wie already have a disclaimer in our warranty saying that
[avoiding] MMT is necessary. Either disconnecting the [on-board diagnostic system, second
generation] or voiding the warranty is the choice, because if you multiply the cost by the num-
ber of cars on the road, it becomes astronomic." Id. at Issue 6, p. 26.
66. See Statement of Claim, supra note 29, at paras. 19-50.
67. Id.
68. NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1102.
69. Id. art. 1106(1)(c).
70. Id. art. 1106(1)(b),(c).
71. Id. art. 1106(6).
72. Statement of Defence, supra note 37, at paras. 4-23.
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ing irregularities resulted from this precipitous action and, thus, there was no breach of
which to complain under article 1116(1). Ethyl Corporation had further omitted to pro-
vide the consent and waivers required by articles 1121 and 1137(1)(c) until the Statement
of Claim was submitted. 73
On the merits, Canada argued that the alleged defamation and loss of goodwill out-
side North America did not fall within the scope of NAFTA. The Tribunal was urged to
consider the measure as affecting primarily trade in goods. Under article 1112(1), other
chapters, such as chapter 3, for example, prevail over chapter 11 if there is an inconsisten-
cy. With respect to national treatment, Canada argued that no distinction was drawn
between investors or investments of Canadians and those of another Party. In Canada's
submission, the measure was simply an accepted way for Canada to meet its international
obligations concerning air pollution. There was no attempt on the part of Canada to tar-
get foreign investors or to favor Canadian investors. Canada stated that all investors and
investments within a province and elsewhere were being treated equally by the Act. On
the "like circumstances" argument, Canada's submission was that MMT was different
from other octane enhancers in methods of production, supply/demand characteristics,
and properties. 74
With respect to performance requirements, Canada argued that the Act required no
given level of percentage of domestic content, did not accord a preference to Canadian
goods or services, and did not require anyone to use MMT produced in Canada or to use
local production facilities. In other words, an import ban could not be equated with a
performance requirement. In the alternative, Canada submitted that, if the Act created
performance requirements, they were within the exceptions of article 1106(6), namely
that they were necessary for the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource, clean air:
"The Act was necessary to prevent the negative impact on clean air, and on life and
health, that would result from the continued use of MMT in gasoline, due to its effects on
vehicle air pollution control devices, oxygen sensors, OBD systems, and spark plugs." 75
With respect to expropriation, Canada asserted that article 1110 dealt with the taking
of property, not with regulation. To constitute expropriation under article 1110, there had
to be a "taking" and Canada submitted that there had been no "taking" of any investment
of Ethyl Corporation. Canada claimed it was acting under "police power" for the mainte-
nance of health, for the conservation of clean air and for the protection of the environ-
ment. In the absence of expropriation, no compensation was payable, according to
73. As noted in the chronology, Ethyl Corporation gave notice of intent to submit a claim on
September 10, 1996. At that point, the Act had not been passed. In fact, it was still before the
House of Commons as Bill C-29. On November 12, 1996, Ethyl Corporation and representa-
tives of the Government of Canada met, perhaps satisfying article 1118, although Canada
denied the meeting was a consultation. See Pleadings and Award of the Tribunal, supra note
27, at para. 78. On April 14, 1997, Ethyl Corporation gave its notice of arbitration pursuant to
article 3 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. It should be noted that Bill C-29 was still before
the Senate on that date. The Bill was given Royal Assent on April 25, 1997. The Act was to
come into force 60 days after Royal Assent. On October 2, 1997, Ethyl Corporation served its
(revised) Statement of Claim, consent and waivers on Canada. Six months prior (April 2,
1997), the Bill was still in the legislative process.
74. See Statement of Defence, supra note 37, at paras. 75-101.
75. Id. at para. 92.
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Canada. Further, Canada claimed the article 1114(1) exception with respect to environ-
mental measures. 76
3. Tribunal Award on Jurisdiction.
The Tribunal met with the disputing parties in New York on October 2, 1997.
Arguments were heard on venue and other procedural issues. It was decided that the
hearing on jurisdiction would take place in Toronto on February 24-25, 1998.
The Tribunal found that Ethyl Corporation's Statement of Claim prima facie satisfied
the requirements of NAFTA article 1116(2) in order to establish the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal. 77 The Tribunal found that the issue of whether the claim was related to trade in
goods or to investment need not be addressed in the context of jurisdiction. When consid-
ering what constitutes a "measure," the Tribunal found that the passage of time had cured
the premature nature of the investor's claim: "In any event, the MMT Act is, as of 24 June
1997, a reality, and therefore the Tribunal is now presented with a claim based on a 'mea-
sure' which has been 'adopted or maintained' within the meaning of Article 1101.:'78
The Tribunal's position is consistent with the International Law Commission's Draft
Articles on State Responsibility. The act of legislating is a "complex act of the State.' It is
therefore governed by article 25(3) of the Draft Articles:
The breach of an international obligation, by a complex act of the State con-
sisting of a succession of actions or omissions by the same or different organs
of the State in respect of the same case, occurs at the moment when the last
constituent element of that complex act is accomplished. Nevertheless, the
time of commission of the breach extends over the entire period between the
action or omission which initiated the breach and that which completed it.79
The time of the breach is relevant to the quantum of damages. In the instant case, the
breach began with the introduction and first reading of Bill C-94 on May 19, 1995.
Previous events such as a statement by the Minister (October 12, 1994) and a departmen-
tal press release (February 17, 1995) are usually not determinative of government policy
and probably cannot be said to have initiated the breach. This could be contested, howev-
er, on the basis of article 8 of the Draft Articles:
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall also be considered as an act
of the State under international law if (a) it is established that such person or
group of persons was in fact acting on behalf of the state; or (b) such person
or group of persons was in fact exercising elements of the governmental
authority in the absence of the official authorities and in circumstances which
justified the exercise of those elements of authority.80
76. "Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or
enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it considers appropriate to
ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environ-
mental concerns." NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1114(1).
77. See Pleadings and Award of the Tribunal, supra note 27, at para. 50.
78. Id. at para. 69.
79. INTERNATIONAL LAw COMMISSION, DRAFT ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY, 272-73 (1991).
80. Id. at 85.
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As a result, Ethyl Corporation would have been justified in claiming damages for the
alleged constructive expropriation from May 19, 1995, or even as early as October 12,
1994. In fact, Ethyl Corporation's claim varied over time, from U.S.$201 million on
September 10, 1996 to U.S.$251 million on October 2, 1997. The principles of mitigation
could be applied to the evaluation of damages; 8 1 depending upon the elasticity of
demand for a gasoline additive having the characteristics of MMT and the likelihood of
stockpiling, Ethyl Canada may have experienced no downturn in business whatsoever, or
perhaps even experienced a spike in business.
Criteria for compensation are provided in article 1110.2, which states the "fair mar-
ket value of the expropriated investment immediately before the expropriation took
place." Article 1110.2 also states that compensation "shall not reflect any change in value
occurring because the intended expropriation had become known earlier." Presumably
this means that the investment should not be evaluated at "fire sale prices" just because
news of the expropriation has been leaked. That this is the appropriate reading of this
article is supported by article 1105.1: "Each Party shall accord to investments of investors
of another Party treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equi-
table treatment and full protection and security."
As we now know, the ban that was imposed on June 24, 1997 was lifted on July 20,
1998. As part of the terms of settlement, the Government of Canada paid approximately
CDN$19.3 million (lobbying expenses likely being significant 82). In a joint press release
dated July 20, 1998, Industry Minister, Honourable John Manley, P.C., M.P., and
Environment Minister, Honourable Christine Stewart, P.C., M.P., stated:
In light of the Government's response to the [Agreement on Internal Trade]
panel's recommendation, it has moved to resolve other challenges to the legis-
lation, launched by Ethyl Corporation under the NAFTA and by Ethyl Canada
[Inc.] in Ontario Court. The Government has agreed to a payment of $13
million (US) to Ethyl representing its reasonable costs and lost profit in
Canada, subject to independent verification. Ethyl will terminate its legal
actions. The Government believes this is in the best interests of Canadians
because it avoids long, protracted and expensive legal proceedings. 83
IV. Discussion.
In Part I of this article, I have attempted to set the stage for a discussion of a misguid-
ed attempt at regulation. Cass and Haring term this "public choice" regulation: "On this
view, government action typically serves the interests of individuals who can band togeth-
81. "Valuation criteria shall include going concern value, asset value including declared tax value
of tangible property, and other criteria, as appropriate, to determine fair market value."
NAFTA, art. 1110.2.
82. Curtis, supra note 14, at 72 ("Ethyl reportedly paid its champion [Hill and Knowlton] upwards
of $3 million [CDN]?').
83. Environment Canada, News Release: Government to act on Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT)
panel report on MMT, (July 20, 1998) (visited May 11, 2000) <http://www.ec.gc.ca/press/
mmt98_n_e.htm>.
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er in sufficient number at low enough cost to secure a favorable vote on an issue of rela-
tively intense interest to them."84 The three big auto-makers did just that, short-circuiting
co-operative efforts with the oil industry in meeting emissions standards. Their message
was simple:
Forget for a minute the big three that are represented by this witness panel
and think of all the other manufacturers that will be making representations
to the Senate committee. I am speaking of Honda, Toyota, and Mercedes.
They will say fundamentally the same thing: It does not work with MMT in
the gasoline. It screws up our system. It will cost money to someone some day
and it even prevents us from meeting the standards the government is asking
us to meet.85
The Government of Canada accepted their argument. Supposedly, Canada would be
harmonizing with the United States by attempting to ban MMT. Shortly after General
Motors approached the Minister of Environment about banning MMT in Canada, however,
the Environmental Protection Agency in the United States reluctantly dropped its ban and
granted Ethyl Corporation a waiver. The harmonization argument in Canada was turned
on its head. Once committed, however, the Canadian government did not turn back. Bill C-
94 died on the Order Paper and was reintroduced as Bill C-29. This Bill eventually became
law and was in force for just over a year before being effectively repealed.
In creating a free trade area extending over all of North America, the NAFTA Parties
were resolved, in particular, to "create an expanded and secure market for the goods and
services produced in their territories" 86 and "reduce distortions to trade." 87 They there-
fore established "clear and mutually advantageous rules governing their trade." 88 In its
Statement on Implementation, the Canadian government affirmed its faith in the efficien-
cies to be gained from removing trade barriers:
The NAFTA thus stands in the tradition of Canadian tradecraft, a tradecraft
that carefully mixed bilateral, regional and multilateral initiatives into a coher-
ent set of laws, regulations, policies and practices, attuned to the circumstances
of the moment but good enough to endure. It allowed Canadians gradually to
move towards more open markets based on the concept that measures that dis-
tort the efficient allocation of resources are likely to lower national and global
welfare while the removal of such barriers is likely to raise them. 89
On chapter 11, the Statement notes the importance of an open investment regime:
84. Cass & Haring, supra note 24, at p. 3.
85. Senate Energy Committee hearings, supra note 19, at Issue 6, p. 28 (quoting Mr. Yves Landry,
President of Chrysler Canada Limited).
86. NAFTA, supra note 2, preamble.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. DEP'T OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, CANADIAN STATEMENT ON
IMPLEMENTATION 72 (1994).
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Over the years, Canada has negotiated investment agreements both to protect
the interests of Canadian investors abroad and to provide a rules-based
approach to the resolution of disputes involving foreign investors in Canada
or Canadian investors abroad. The [Canada-United States Free Trade
Agreement] marked the first time that Canada entered into a comprehensive
set of rules governing both inward and outward investment. The NAFTA
builds on that experience. It includes a more integrated and extensive set of
obligations which will ensure that Canadian interests will continue to be pro-
tected within a set of generic rules. It also includes important new provisions
for dispute resolution and addresses a broader range of issues related to the
conduct of business. The NAFTA chapter thus reflects not only the addition
of Mexico, but also the increasing importance of an open investment regime
in underwriting economic growth and development in Canada. 90
These statements are reflective of what Cass and Haring call the "public interest"
genre the hallmark of which is to "promote widely accepted normative goals, such as effi-
ciency."91 That governments should alternate between public interest and public choice is
not surprising. The challenge is to maximize public interest behavior on the part of gov-
ernment. Put another way, governments should interfere with trade as little as possible:
Non-discrimination in international trade is simply a mechanism for
enabling the effective operation of the principle of comparative advantage.
How does it do this? As we have seen, according to that principle, production
and global welfare are enhanced if States do not impose barriers to trade. The
absence of these barriers ensures that specialization can occur and that pro-
duction is efficient. 92
These principles will guide the reflection in Part II of this article. To conclude Part I,
the Canadian government's attempted ban of MMT (using the legal means at its disposal)
was a failure. There was no scientific consensus that MMT harmed human health. MMT
was shown to be cheap and effective. It was even recognized that it reduced nitrogen
oxide emissions. The automobile manufacturers succeeded in convincing a majority of
the Senate committee to answer the question as to whether or not MMT-based gasoline
was the cause of on-board diagnostic malfunctioning in the following way:
There is evidence supplied by 21 car manufacturers who are unanimous in
their opinion that MMT has a negative effect on OBD-II systems. There is evi-
dence supplied by one corporation, the manufacturer of MMT, which believes
that MMT does not have a negative effect on OBD-II systems. Based on the
preponderance of evidence the government was justified in invoking the pre-
cautionary principle and introducing Bill C-29 as the prudent, responsible
course of action.93
90. Id. at 147.
91. Cass & Haring, supra note 24, at 3.
92. D. M. McRae, The Contribution of International Trade Law to the Development of International
Law, 260 RECUEIL DES COURS 165 (1996).
93. Senate Energy Committee hearings, supra note 19, at Issue 14, p. 16.
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The impugned negative effects of MMT on human health and the environment were
not proven to the satisfaction of the majority. With respect to the OBD systems, the
minority concluded as follows:
Taking into consideration the entire body of evidence presented to the
Committee, it is possible to conclude that MMT does not harm the function-
ing of OBD systems. It is not possible to conclude the opposite. Both the U.S.
EPA and the U.S. Courts have thoroughly considered the evidence presented
by both Ethyl Corporation and the car companies. Both independently reject-
ed the claims of the auto manufacturers in supporting the conclusion that
MMT "does not cause or contribute" to the failure of OBD systems. We also
agree that, based on the evidence presented during our hearings, that the auto
makers and the government have "not come close" to proving otherwise. The
small amount of warranty data they did provide was not subjected to any
independent third party review.
The auto companies are experiencing significant problems with their OBD
systems, but no scientific proof has been provided to the Committee that
these difficulties are caused by MMT.
The question of whether MMT causes or contributes to the failure of auto-
mobiles' OBD systems is key to the principle of this Bill. Based on a thorough
examination of the testimony and evidence before the Committee we con-
clude the following:
1. The auto makers are experiencing significant problems with the function-
ing of their OBD systems;
2. The evidence strongly suggests that OBD malfunctions are unrelated to the
use of MMT-based petroleum. 94
It appears to me that the Senate Committee's support of Bill C-29 in its Interim
Report was weak. The Committee nevertheless reported the Bill to the Senate without
amendment where it was adopted and given Royal Assent. The absence of 'any discussion
on the trade-restricting effects of the Bill is surprising, especially given the extensive and
detailed testimony on that point from international trade lawyers Ivan Feltham and Barry
Appleton (counsel to Ethyl Corporation and Ethyl Canada Inc.). 95 It is true that the
Committee had a distinct Order of Reference from the Senate dated February 4, 1997 to
study three specific questions (the effect of MMT on OBD systems, health, and the envi-
ronment). The absence of a question on trade is, in retrospect, surprising.
On the parliamentary process, Ethyl Corporation alleged that the debate in
Parliament and associated statements by public officials adversely affected the company's
goodwill both inside and outside Canada. According to Ethyl Corporation's Statement of
Claim: "This constituted an expropriation as defined in the NAFTA commencing on the
introduction of the MMT Act, with damage continuing thereafter."96 Parliamentary
94. Id. at Issue 14, p. 37-38.
95. Id. at Issue 12.
96. Statement of Claim, supra note 29, at 8.
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debate is protected within Canada by absolute privilege. 9 7 It will be interesting to see
whether or not the privilege is recognized as absolute under NAFTA or to what extent
speech in Parliament or a Legislature (that does not result in legislation) could neverthe-
less be qualified as a measure tantamount to expropriation under NAFTA article 1110.
Appendix I. Brief chronology.98
* 1920s: Ethyl Corporation began supplying lead for leaded gasoline.
* 1977: MMT banned in the United States under amendments to the Clean Air
Act.
* 1977: use of MMT commenced in Canada as an additive to unleaded gasoline
thereby replacing tetraethyl lead in gasoline.
* 1978: Health and Welfare Canada issued a study, which concluded that there was
no evidence to indicate that the use of MMT would constitute a hazard to
human health.
* 1979: Beginning of the phase-out of leaded gasoline in the United States because
of its adverse effect on catalytic converters and for health reasons.
* 1986: The Royal Society of Canada issued a report which concluded that the
extra loading on the public at large from MMT is and will remain very small.
* January 1, 1994: NAFTA in force.
* 1994: Health Canada studied the health effects of the use of MMT in unleaded
gasoline and concluded that the combustion products of MMT in gasoline do
not represent an added health risk to the Canadian population.
* February 17, 1995: Maureen Kempston Darkes, President of General Motors
Canada Ltd. wrote to the Honourable Sheila Copps, P.C., M.P., Minister of the
Environment, informing her that concerns about the effects of MMT on emis-
sion control devices had caused General Motors to disconnect the on-board
diagnostic warning lights on its 1996 model year vehicles.
* April 1995: the U.S. District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to grant Ethyl Corporation a waiver for
MMT from the federal rule that additives not affect catalytic converters adversely.
* May 19, 1995: introduction and first reading of Bill C-94, An Act to regulate the
interprovincial trade in and the importation for commercial purposes of certain
manganese-based substances (Bill C-94).
* July 18, 1995: Signing of the Agreement on Internal Trade.
* October 1995: U.S. Federal Appeals Court ruled that Ethyl Corporation could
perform more manganese health testing while marketing MMT because the
additive was registered before 1994.
97. "The privilege of freedom of speech is both the least questioned and the most fundamental
right of the Member of Parliament on the floor of the house and in Committee. It is primarily
guaranteed in the British Bill of Rights." ALISTAIR FRASER, ET AL., BEAUCHESNE'S RULES & FORMS
OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS OF CANADA WITH ANNOTATIONS, COMMENTS AND PRECEDENTS (6th
ed. 1989) at 22.
98. See Pleadings and Award of the Tribunal, supra note 27, at 9-10.
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* December 1995: MMT reapproved for use in the United States.
* February 23, 1996: By letter, the Minister of International Trade (the
Honourable Art Eggleton, P.C., M.P.) warned the Minister of the Environment
(the Honourable Sergio Marchi, P.C., M.P.) that the MMT legislation would
constitute an impermissible prohibition on imports and could not be justified
on health or environmental grounds.
* March 18, 1996: The U.S. Environmental Defense Fund announced that some of
the nation's largest petroleum companies have said that they have no plans to
use MMT in gasoline.
* April 22, 1996: Bill C-94 re-introduced where it stood as Bill C-29.
* September 10, 1996: Ethyl Corporation issued its Notice of Intent to submit a
Claim to Arbitration against the Government of Canada.
* November 12, 1996: Meeting between Ethyl Corporation and Officials of the
Government of Canada (Steve Brereton of the Investment Trade Policy Division,
DFAIT, faxed Ethyl Corporation's lawyer to say that "today's meeting is not a
consultation.").
* April 9, 1997: Bill C-29 given a third reading by the Senate.
* April 14, 1997: Ethyl Corporation issued its Notice of Arbitration against the
Government of Canada and appointed the Honourable Charles N. Brower as
Arbitrator.
* April 25, 1997: Bill C-29 received Royal Assent as the Manganese-based Fuel
Additives Act, S.C. 1997, c. 11 (the Act) (to come into force 60 days after Royal
Assent).
* June 24, 1997: Act in force.
* July 8, 1997: Waivers required by NAFTA article 1121(1) were prepared by Ethyl
Corporation and Ethyl Canada Inc.
* July 14, 1997: Canada confirmed that it had appointed the Honourable Marc
Lalonde, P.C., as Arbitrator.
* September 2, 1997: Tribunal constituted pursuant to Section B of chapter 11 of
the NAFTA and the UNCITRAL Rules; Professor Karl-Heinz B6chstielgel was
appointed by ICSID as Presiding Arbitrator.
October 2, 1997 (New York): First meeting between the Tribunal and the Parties;
Ethyl Corporation delivered its complete Statement of Claim to the Government
of Canada.
October 10, 1997: Hearing before Justice Swinton of the Ontario Court (General
Division) wherein Ethyl Canada Inc. brought a constitutional challenge to the Act.
* October 13, 1997: Tribunal issued a Procedural Order on the date of the next
meeting.
* November 27, 1997: The Government of Canada issued its Statement of Defence
with respect to the claim by Ethyl Corporation.
* November 28, 1997: Tribunal issued a Procedural Order on the place of hearings
(Toronto).
* December 29, 1997: Canada's Memorial on Jurisdiction was filed.
* January 30, 1998: Ethyl Corporation's Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction was
filed.
Winter 2000 71
* February 24-25, 1998 (Toronto): Hearing on jurisdiction.
* March 11, 1998: Submission by Mexico to the Tribunal on the interpretation of
the NAFTA.
* April 15, 1998: Alberta, Saskatchewan and Quebec challenge the MMT ban
through the Agreement on Internal Trade.
* June 12, 1998: Panel constituted under the Agreement on Internal Trade makes
its report public: the Act is found to be inconsistent with the Agreement and the
inconsistency is not justified by the legitimate objectives test contained in the
Agreement.
* June 24, 1998: Award on Jurisdiction by the Tribunal: jurisdiction taken despite
Canada's objections.
* July 20, 1998: Government of Canada reversed the MMT ban and acknowledged
that MMT does not impair the diagnostic systems of vehicles and that there is
no scientific evidence of health or environmental problems caused by MMT;
Canada paid approximately CDN$19.5 million to Ethyl Corporation.
